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Case No. 16900 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to the portions of 
two roads crossing a section of real estate in which the legal 
title is owned by Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial, a Judgment and Decree was entered against 
Plaintiff-Appellant in favor of Defendant-Respondents, declaring 
that Plaintiff-Appellant's title to the real estate in question 
is subject to a public road thirty (30) feet in width. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
That the lower court's judgment be reversed and title 
to the real estate in question be quieted in appellants subject 
to easements of record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
For the purpose of this brief, appellant shall be 
referred to hereafter as plaintiff and respondents shall collect-
ively be referred to hereafter as defendants. 
The property involved in this action is Section 35, 
Township 1 North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and is located at the mouth of a canyon known as Tollgate Canyon. 
Section 35 is divided into two parts by Interstate 80, a non-
access highway (previously Highway 30), Silver Creek, and some 
railroad tracks. When the freeway was constructed, duri_ng 1962 -
1965, an overpass was built and designated "Ranch Exit". There 
are two roads crossing the West portion of Section 35 which are , 
the principal subject of the action. Exhibits P-16 through 19 
are aerial photographs depicting Section 35 and the roads. At 
page 179 of the record is a copy of one of the aerial photograph 
showing the roads in yellow. The following page is a reproduc-
tion of that page colored as in the Exhibit. The black line nea, 
the "Y" in th.e road is the boundary of plaintiff's property. 
This· action was commenced August 12, 1974 (R. 07), a 
short time after plaintiffs became aware of the development of 
a subdivis·ion and use of the s·ubject road as an access to said 
subdivision. 
-2-
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The evidence is that there was a road in Tollgate 
Canyon dating back as early as 1915 used for hauling supplies 
to sheepherders in the area to the North and West of the 
Bertagnole land in Section 35. The road, to the middle 1960s. 
was generally described by the witnesses as a "2 rut" road. 
It was also used by deer hunters and for picnics. The sheep 
men who used the road were Fay Bates, John Bates, the Richins 
and Bittners who owned grazing land adjoining and in close 
proximity to the Bertagnole land. 
Fay Bates testified that he owned Section 26 which 
was likewise divided by Silver Creek, the railroad track, and 
the highway. He grazed sheep on the part of Section 35 located 
West of Silver Creek and the Bertagnoles grazed the Bates land 
in Section 26 East of Silver Creek. Bates never asked per-
miss lon to use the road across Section 35. See Fay Bates' 
deposition (R. 216, pp. 27-29). It is apparent that this ex-
change of use of portions of the sections mentioned was for 
practical reas·ons .. 
The Bates sold thei.r grazing land to Darrell Christ-
enson in 1965 
1 
who bought th.e property for resale. He sold 
about 480 acres in 1966, and leased b.~e remaining land to sheep 
men for grazing purposes~ There is no evidence of any change 
of use 0r substantial improvement of the roads crossing Section 
35 between 1966 and 1970. The evidence is that Christenson, or 
his corporatton, sold acreage in the sections North of Tollgate 
-3-
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Canyon for subdivision and resale to Br~nt Jensen 'and his 
corporations in 1970. A program of road widening and con-
struction took place from 1970 through 1977. In 1977, Amoco 
constructed and improved roads to its oil or gas well. 
A table showing issuance of building permits was 
offered in evidence, Exhibit D-3 (R. 158). It shows the per-
mits issued through 1974 as follows: 
1972 8 
1973 
1974 
11 
10 
Brent Jensen testified that 595 lots have been sold and 49 to 
50 miles of road constructed since 1972 (T-135 and T-148) . 
Lot owners have constructed 120 cabins. Exhibits D-6 and D-7 
show the roads constructed in the subdivided area. 
Brent Jensen testified that he improved the road by 
grading it (T. 106); that the wearing surface of the road was 
12' to 13' wide in 1970 (T. 113); that he had never been told 
by the Bertagnoles that the rpad crossing the Bertagnole prop-
erty was not a public road; th.at h_e had never been denied 
access; and that he was unaware of any objection to the use of 
the road and land in Section 35 until this suit was filed. 
(T. 120-121) On cross-examination, he admitted receipt of the 
several letters, showing that over a period of nearly a year 
be_fe)re this suit was filed th_ere had been correspondence and 
negotiations between the Bertagnoles' attorney and agents and 
-4-
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Brent Jensen and his corporations and agents relating to the 
unauthorized use of the road and of the Bert1gnole land ~l·St 
of the freeway as a site for a sales office. Several deadlines 
for the filing of the suit were mentioned in the letters and 
the filing of the suit was delayed pending negotiations for the 
purchase by Jensen of Section 35 or that part of the Section 
located West of the freeway. (T. 165-176) 
The negotiations relating to the use and proposed 
sale of land in Section 35 were described generally by Greg 
Lawson who participated in them. With Brent Jensen's admissions 
on cross-examination and the testimony of Leo Bertagnole, Harold 
Bertagnole, and Greg Lawson (R. 168), there can be no doubt about 
the Bertagnoles' objections to the use of the road well before 
the suit was filed. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE ROADWAYS IN QUESTION HAVE NOT BEEN DEDICATED AND 
ABANDONED TO THE USE OF THE PUBLIC BY CONTINUOUS 
USE FOR A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS PRIOR 
TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE LAW SUIT 
A. THE BURDEN OF PROOF ESTABLISHING PUBLIC USE 
FOR THE REQUIRED PERIOD OF TIME IS ON THOSE CLAIMING IT. 
The law is well settled in this State that the burden 
of proof that a road has been dedicated and abandoned to the 
use of the public is on those claiming it. 
We quote from Bonner v. Sudbury, 18 Utah 2d 140, 417 
P 2d 646 at p. 648: 
-5-
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"In connection with this review we deem it 
appropriate to note our agreement that.the dedi-
cation of one's property to a public use should 
not be regarded lightly and that certain prin-
ciples.· should be adhered to. The presumption 
is in favor of the troperty owner; and the burd~n 
of establishing pub ic use for the required period 
of time is on those claiming it. The mere fact 
that members of the public may use a private 
driveway or alley without interference will not 
necessarily establish it as a public way ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
In· Peterson v·. · Combe, 20 Utah 2d 3 76, 438 P 2d 545 
(1968) at Page 546, the following is held: 
" .... we think the burden of proving a real 
public use continuously for 10 years was not met 
here in the light of principles to the effect that 
dedication of right to the public generally must 
·be displayed by clear and convincing evidence. 
Th~s we say even in view of the other principle 
that on review we canvass the facts in a light 
more favorable to the conclusions of the arbiter 
of the facts. These principles clash somewhat, 
but where individual property rights are at stake 
we must not treat such rights lightly." 
See also Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P 291; 
and Thomps·on, Real Property, Vol. 2, Sec. 525. 
The defendants are seeking a judgment declaring that 
the part of the Tollgate road in Section 35 has been dedicated 
and abandoned to the use of the public on the theory that the 
road has been used by the public continuously for a period of 
ten years as provided by Section 27-12-89 UCA, 1953. This 
section provides: 
"A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated 
and abandoned to the use of the public when it 
has been continuously us·ed as a public thorough-
fare for a period of ten years." 
-6-
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The Su?reme Court of Utah has construed the above 
quoted secti~n in several cases and has defined its ~ erm:.;. 
The case of Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243. 161 P. 
1127, holds that there must be evidence of intent by the 
owner to dedtcate a road to the public and an acceptance by 
the public to establish a public road. 
The Court in the case of Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 
2d 340, 273 P 2d 720, at p. 723, quotes with approval a defini-
tion of the word "thoroughfare" and points out that the mere 
fact that a private way is also used by the public, without 
objection by the owner, will not make it a public way. 
The recent case of Harding v. Bohman, 26 Utah 2d, 
439, 491 P 2d 233, was an action by a landowner to have a cer-
tain strip of land declared a public highway. The record 
showed use by sheepmen and deer hunters and that the road was 
not maintained at public expense. The finding of the trial 
court that the evidence failed to show a public dedication was 
sustained and the judgment affirmed. 
In Peterson v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P 2d 545, 
the Court held that evidence that a road was used by property 
owners abutting or straddling the road and that property at the 
end of the road had no allure for the public was insufficient 
to show public use. 
In the case of ·Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 
p 2d 426, the Court affirmed a Summary Judgment where there was 
-7-
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no showing of ·intent of the landowners to establish a public 
road. 
The case of Thomp·son v. Gondas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 439 
P 2d 639, holds that" .... clear and convincing quantum and 
quality of proof .... " is neces-sary for the establishment of a 
publi.c thoroughfare. 
Text writers state the rule that the intent of the 
landowner to dedicate the road to public use and acceptance by 
the public must be sh.own by clear and convincing evidence. In 
Ti.ff any Real· Prope·rty '(Jr'd Ed) , Vol. 4, Section 1102, it is 
stated that the mere t'act th.at the land has been used by the 
public does not, of itself, sh.ow a dedication thereof by the 
owner. We quote: 
i.s stated: 
"And the owner's mere acquiescense in the use 
of land by th.e public for purposes of travel or 
recreation can furnish but slight evidence of dedi-
cation when such land is unenclosed land, not in 
use for the purpose of cultivation or otherwise. 
Dedicat:Lon will not be. inferred from mere permissive 
use of unenclosed land." 
In Powell on ReaT Pr·operty, Vol. 6A, Section 934, it 
"The operative facts requisite for the find-
ing of a dedication have two aspects, the objec-
.tively manifested desire of the landowner to 
devote a land interes·t to public use, and the 
public acceptance of the offer." 
-8-
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B · THE RECORD DOES :HJT SHOW THE REQUISITE 
INTENTION OF THE LANDOWNERS TO DEDICATE OR ABANDQ:; THEIR 
LAND TO THE USE OF THE PUBLIC AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE PUBLIC. 
The defendants have not in their pleadings or at 
the trial indicated over what ten year period the Bertagnoles 
or their predecessors dedicated or abandoned their land to 
public use. During the period from the 1930s to 1971, the 
land, which is now subdivided by Brent Jensen and his corpora-
tions, was used by the Bates and other sheep men for summer 
grazing of sheep. Darrell Christensen testified that he 
purchased the land in 1965 and leased it for sheep grazing from 
1966 to 1971. Subdivision and lot sales took place from 1972 
to date and unquestionably the road was improved and used by 
numerous cabin owners during and after 1972. 
In view of the fact that this action was filed in 
1974, it is obvi:ous that the only ten year period which can 
be relied upon to show dedication of the Bertagnole land to 
public use would include at least eight years when the use of 
the road was by sheep men, deer hunters, and people on picnics. 
These uses were not for public benefit, but were for private 
uses to property owners own land or were for persons who were 
trespassi~g on or using private land with or without permission. 
The evidence did not show any public land accessible only by 
the road in question. Section 27-12-89 should not be construed 
to grant access to the general public to areas under private 
-9-
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' 
ownership where no public need is shown. In the present case 
no evidence was presented showing a public allure as referred 
to in Peterson v. Combe, supra. There is also no showing of 
any kind that the county or other public entity improved the 
road or otherwise showed any intention to accept it as a public 
road. 
On the contrary the evidence is clear and beyond 
dispute that the State of Utah acquired a strip of land lying 
West of the West line of the freeway in Section 35 North of the 
overpass for a stock trail and East of the East line of the 
freeway South of the overpass for a stock trail. It will be 
noted that the Final Order of Condemnation, referred to above, 
requires the State of Utah to " .... keep, maintain and repair in 
reasonable and satisfactory condition the livestock fence located 
on the condemned premises and adjoining the remaining land of the 
defendant herein .... " The testimony is that the fence was con-
structed and that a gate in the fence constructed by the State of 
Utah and blocking the new Tollgate road had been removed and 
destroyed (Exhibit 1). 
The State of Utah acquired the easement for a livestock 
trail by order of condemnation in 1967 which is quoted from above, 
Any claim of a public road based on use since that date would be 
subordinate to the State Easement. 
I.n the earlier years, before the construction of the 
freeway and the fence along the stock trail, there is evidence 
-10-
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from disinterested witnesses Gillmor (R. 209-221), Willi~ 
Bittner (R. 221-235) and Frank Toole (R. 176-187) that there 
was a fence across the mouth of Tollgate Canyon and a gate. 
It will be noted that the deed quoted from above from Boley 
to Uinta Pipeline Company requires the grantee to erect gates 
and to provide good locks with keys. 
Another significant fact which negates any claimed 
intent on the part of the landowners to dedicate the road to 
the public is that the two-rut road went nowhere except to 
private livestock grazing land. It is impossible to believe 
that sheep men who are always on the alert to protect the herd 
from public interference intended to establish a public road to 
give the public access to the herd. See the deposition of Fay 
Bates (R. 216, pages 30 and 31), where he stated that he often 
wished someone would control the road. There is evidence that 
the present owners have tried to exclude deer hunters. This is 
inconsistent with a public road. 
The aerial photos. show a change of approach and road 
location in Section 35 between 1962 and 1967. There is no 
evidence to indicate that the Bertagnoles intended public use 
of the new approach from the overpass to a road on the North 
of the creek. This possibility must be entirely disregarded 
because there was no ten-year period between the completion of 
t: the highway project and 1974 when this action was filed. Further, 
the correspondence and negotiations between Brent Jensen and the 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bertagnoles proves that the Bertagnoles actually did not in-
tend to abandon their property to public use. 
There is a dispute in the evidence as to ·whether the 
old road went up Tollgate Canyon from the old state highway on 
the. South or North side of the creek. It is undisputed that 
the road constructed by the pipeline company and other utility 
companies was on the South side in Section 35 and shows very 
clearly on the aerial ph.otos. Fay Bates testified that between 
1949 and 1958 the utility companies made major repairs on the 
road. See Fay Bates' deposition (R. 216, pages 42 and 43). It 
is very clear from his testimony that the road up the canyon 
was on the South. side. Th.ere was a major change in the road 
location after construction of the freeway. 
The testimony that for practical reasons the Bertagnole 
and Bates· exchanged the use o:E the part of Section 35 West of the 
highway, track and Silver Creek for the part of Section 26 lying 
East of the barriers mentioned shows that any use of Section 35 
West of the highway was permissive and for the convenience of 
the parties. It could not, th~refore, be evidence of intent to 
abandon to a public use. 
II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRJAL COURT'S 
FINDING AND JUDGMENT THAT A PUBLIC ROAD 
THIRTY FEET IN WIDTH WAS ABANDONED TO THE PUBLIC 
For the purpose of argument only, if it is assumed 
that tne road in question was in fact dedicated to the public 
-12-
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in accordance with Section 27-12-89, UCA, 1953. then an 
appropriate width must be determined for the road. 
The above-referenced statute does not contain any 
guide as to how the width is determined. In the instant case 
the trial court in its memorandum decision inserted the nota-
tion that the roadway is "15' wide" (R. 178). In the Findings 
of Fact at R. 203 and the Conclusions of Law at R. 204, SO feet 
in width was typed and the trial court made a pen and ink change 
with initials to 30'. This doubled the width of the road from 
that found in the original memorandum decision (R. 178). 
In Boyer v. Clark, 7 U 2d 395, 326 P 2d 107 (1958), 
where a public road was determined to have been dedicated in 
accordance with Section 27-12-89 UCA 1953, the Supreme Court 
remanded for the lower court to determine the width of the road 
with the following instruction: 
'' .... the width of the highway, which must be 
determined in accordance with what is reasonable 
and necessary for the uses to which the road has 
been put.'' 
See also Blonguist v. Blonquist, 30 U 2d 234, 516 P 2d. 
343 (J.973}. 
The determination as to width must therefore be based 
upon uses- to which ~he road was put during the applicable 10 
year period provided for in Section 27-12-89 UCA 1953. In the 
present case, the testimony concerning the use of the road · .. 1as 
that it was limited to hauling sheep supplies, picnics, deer 
hunting and fishing, and there was no evidence of other uses 
-13-
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pr:L-or to the. development of subdivision in 1970 when Brent 
Jensen acqui.red property- above.the road in question in 
Section 35 (JL 105). Mr. Jens-en testified that the road in 
19.70. was passable by car (R. 105), and as· follows at Page 113 
of the transcript: 
"A. Oh, the wearing surface of the road I 
would say would probably be maybe twelve feet wide, 
thirteen· feet wide. 
nq. The travelled portion of the road was 
twelve or thi.rteen feet wide? 
"A. R~ght, the weari~g surface. 
"Q. Now, where would that width be, was it 
that wide in 19-- or in Section 35? 
r'A. I would say probably. 
''Q,. D.id you ever measure it? 
''A. No, not really. 
"Q. Was that road in Section 35 North of the 
creek "grave.Ile.cl? 
""A. No._'' 
There was· no evidence of any buildi~g permits having 
beeri. iss:ued i:n. th.e ·areas above the. road in question prior to 
19.72... In view of thi.s, and th.e. 0th.er testimony previously cited 
th~t there i's no evidence of us·e of the road as primary access 
tq a subdivi.s·ion during any ten year period required by Section 
27-12-89., UCA, 1953, prior to th.e commencement of this lawsuit 
i-:n August 1974. 
The question to be resolved is what width of road is 
reasonable and necessary for use by sheepmen, picnickers., hunters! 
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and fishermen. The road across plainliffs' property is 
approximately 1100 feet. (R. 21) In each of the uses 
established prior to the filing of the lawsuit, a single 
lane road wide enough for one vehicle is all that is reason-
able and necessary. There was no evidence presented as to 
the number of cars traveling the road during any period of 
time, the necessity for cars passing one another, nor any 
evidence as to why the road should be more than one lane. 
It should be noted that the road in question does not con-
nect to any public road or land and that during any ten year 
period before the lawsuit was commenced in 1974 there has not 
been a continuous use of the road in question to serve a 
subdivision. 
Th.e width of the road existing for any period of 
~ 
ten years prior to the commencement of the lawsuit was 5 to 
6 feet in 1915 (R. 216, p. 39) to the 12 to 13 feet quoted 
above. In view of the private land surrounding the road and 
the minimal use of the road if in fact a public road were 
established, there was no support for a road exceeding 12 to 
13 feet as existed prior to the development of the subdivi-
sions beyond plaintiffs' land here in question. Any larger 
area dedicated to roadway would constitute a taking of private 
property with compensation and would be unconstitutional. 
In the event a public road is determined, it should 
be no wider than 13 feet, as this is adequate room for a vehicle 
to traverse the area. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence of use of the portion of Section 35 by 
sheepmen, deer hunters and picnickers prior to 1971 under the 
facts and circumstances of this case falls far short of meet-
ing the requirements of Section 27-12-89, UCA, 1953, and the 
Supreme Court cases that there must be clear and convincing 
proof of intent to dedicate or abandon property to the public 
and of acceptance by the public. One undisputed fact which 
has great significance is that the road went only to private 
grazing land and that there was no public need for access to 
the land. As has been held in· Thompson v. Nelson, supra, the 
mere use of a private way does not create a public way. The 
Supreme Court has held in cases cited that use by deer hunters 
is not sufficient. The judgment finding a public way should 
be reversed in accordance with Section 27-12-89, UCA, 1953. 
Even if a public way were established, it should only 
be wide enough as is reasonable and necessary for the uses to 
which the road has been put. During the applicable period the 
only uses were. as outlined above with no proof of regularity 
of use or need for more than a single lane. During any ten 
year period, the evidence was that the travelled portion did 
not exceed 13 feet. Based upon the evidence of use and the 
actual width of the road prior to this lawsuit, 13 feet is a 
reasonable width for such a road and the Judgment and Decree 
should be modified accordingly. 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respectfully submitced. 
SKEEN AND SKEEN 
By: ~$I 
R.. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant was mailed to Defendants-Respondents' attorneys, 
postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
\ 
on this-
Richard H. Nebeker 
GREENE, CALLISTER & NEBEKER 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Stanley S. Adams 
Boston Buildl.ng 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ii 3E- day of July, 1980. 
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